This paper introduces a novel graph-analytic approach for detecting anomalies in network flow data called GraphPrints. Building on foundational network-mining techniques, our method represents time slices of traffic as a graph, then counts graphlets-small induced subgraphs that describe local topology. By performing outlier detection on the sequence of graphlet counts, anomalous intervals of traffic are identified, and furthermore, individual IPs experiencing abnormal behavior are singled-out. Initial testing of Graph-Prints is performed on real network data with an implanted anomaly. Evaluation shows false positive rates bounded by 2.84% at the time-interval level, and 0.05% at the IP-level with 100% true positive rates at both.
INTRODUCTION
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ACM acknowledges that this contribution was authored or co-authored by an employee, or contractor of the national government. As such, the Government retains a nonexclusive, royalty-free right to publish or reproduce this article, or to allow others to do so, for Government purposes only. Permission to make digital or hard copies for personal or classroom use is granted. Copies must bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. To copy otherwise, distribute, republish, or post, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. essential, these alone are insufficient. Signature-based detection methods (such as anti-virus software, intrusion detection systems, and firewalls) identify malicious traffic using heuristics that are usually handcrafted; hence, such methods are only effective when encountering a previously analyzed attack. In order to gain traction in understanding network activity, security analysts turn to semi-manual investigation of network data (e.g., firewall logs, packet capture data, network flows, system logs), but are met with an abundance of data and a scarcity of information; for example, flow data alone from a small network will constitute 10-100 million records per day. Anomaly detection methods, which seek to single out unexpected events, propose a much needed compliment to current methods, as they pinpoint noteworthy events for further investigation and hold the promise of detecting never-before-seen attacks.
CISRC
In this paper, we introduce GraphPrints, a novel network anomaly detection algorithm that uses graph analytics to identify qualitative changes in network traffic at the IP and whole network level. We concentrate on network flows-records of communication between a source and destination IP address. More specifically, flows give the metadata (timestamp, IPs, ports, protocol, etc.) describing communication between a pair of IPs over a small time window (see inset table in Section 2). As such, network flows are a primary data source for monitoring, diagnosing, and investigating network traffic. Our method divides network traffic into time slices that are naturally represented as a graph. More specifically, a graph G = (V, E) is defined as a set of vertices, V (representing entities, IPs in our case), and edges, E (representing relationships between pairs of vertices-communication between IPs in our case.) The Graph-Prints method mines graphlets-small, induced subgraphs, which can be thought of as the building blocks of the graph that describe the local topology-then performs outlier detection to find those time windows of traffic that exhibit uncharacteristic graphlet counts. In order to isolate the specific IPs engaging in unexpected traffic, for each vertex v of a graph, GraphPrints also tracks the graphlet automorphism orbits containing v (see Section 2.2), which characterizes the role v's IP plays in communication patterns. This simultaneous detection capability not only identifies time windows of anomalous traffic, but also focuses the operator on those IPs in the time window exhibiting uncharacteristic behavior.
Our hypothesis is that an unusual occurrence in network traffic will produce a detectable change in graphlet counts. To test this, we implement the multi-level detector on real network traffic with an implanted anomaly-a host engaging in bit torrent traffic -and report promising results highlighting GraphPrints' potential (Section 3).
The GraphPrints method builds on foundational work of Milo et al. [3] and Pržulj et al. [5] (among others) where graphlets and automorphism orbits are used for network classification, alignment, and comparison. To our knowledge, this is the first work to propose a network anomaly detection algorithm for the dynamic graph setting based on graphlets or automorphism orbits. We note that the idea for multi-level anomaly detection on time-varying graph data follows contributions of Bridges et al. [1] , which create a generative model for detection on synthetic graph data at node, community, and whole graph levels. Additionally, a position paper of Halappanavar et al. [2] outlines a "networkof-networks" design for cyber security applications and calls for graphlet analysis of flow data, but to our knowledge no implementation of these ideas has yet been pursued.
GRAPHPRINTS WORKFLOW
In order to perform streaming anomaly detection based on graph analytics, network flow data must be observed, converted into a sequence of graphs, and fed to an algorithm for identifying aberrations in the graph data. This section outlines the steps used in our detection workflow from tapping network communication, to identifying unexpected time windows of network activity.
To tap network flow data, we used ARGUS 
Representation of Flow Data as Graphs
We seek to represent network flow data in a given time interval as a directed graph (digraph) G using a vertex for each IP and letting flow records generate edges. To do this, we create a preliminary graph H with vertices for IP addresses and, naturally, an edge for each flow. More specifically, upon observation of a flow record, a directed edge from the source 1 http://qosient.com/ IP's vertex to the destination IP's vertex is created, and we weight each edge by the flow's total bytes record. Furthermore, we color an edge blue if at least one of the ports is well known (i.e., less than 1024) and red if both ports are not well known (1024 or greater). 2 Since multiple flows can occur between the same pair of IPs in the time interval, H is a multi-digraph, meaning it admits multiple edges between any pair of vertices, and we aggregate the multi-edges to create the desired graph, G. Specifically, for each source vertex i and destination vertex j of H, let Bi,j (Ri,j) be the sum of edge weights, total bytes, over the blue (red) edges from i to j. If Bi,j > Ri,j (Ri,j ≥ Bi,j), create a blue (red) edge from i to j in G. Thus our final graph, G, has colored, directed, and unweighted edges representing the collection of flows observed in the time interval.
Graphlet & Orbit Vectors
To capture a network's behavior over time, we examine graphlets-small, connected, induced 3 subgraphs of the network. Graphlets are an important network characteristic as they capture the local topology of the network. For instance, observing many stars or many paths (see Figure 1 ) provides an understanding of the overall structure of the network [3, 5] . Given a graph Gi from time window i, we count occurrences of all graphlets up to size k, and store the counts in a graphlet degree vector, denoted gi. See Figure 1 for an example graph Gi with graphlet degree vector gi. The notion of graphlets is easily extended to include colored vertices and edges as well as directed edges, as is our current interest. In this case, topologically equivalent graphlets with different colorings are considered different. While coloring allows encoding of contextual information, the number of graphlets grows combinatorially with the number of colors, which can pose issues of computational cost or memory usage.
To capture a vertex's behavior over time, we will examine graphlet automorphism orbits. 4 The automorphism orbits of a graph are sets of vertices that are symmetric in the graph. Intuitively, the automorphism orbits are the different roles a vertex can fill in that graph; for instance, a star has two automorphism orbits-one for the center vertex and one for the leaf vertices. The orbit vector of v is a vector whose entries are the counts of the graphlet automorphism orbits in which v participates. Given a graph Gi and a vertex v, we denote the orbit vector of v in Gi as a i v (see Figure 1 ). Orbit vectors are useful characteristics because they describe a vertex's extended neighborhood in a graph. For instance, a vertex who appears in the center of many stars is likely different from a vertex who appears always as a leaf.
To summarize the workflow up to this point, network flow data is observed in near real time, and is represented as a sequence of graphs, G1, G2, . . . . For a given graph Gi, graphlet vectors gi characterize the network at the graph-level (i.e., changes over the whole time-window of network activity) and the orbit vectors a i v characterize the network at the vertex level. As an analogy, graphlet vectors are like handprints and orbit vectors are like fingerprints, hence the term GraphPrints. There are several available tools to count graphlets. In this study, we used FanMod 5 [8] . We note that in the FanMod implementation there is no extra computation to count graphlet automorphism orbits as this is already a step in the process of graphlet counting.
Anomaly Detection Framework
In order to perform detection at the graph level, we fit a multivariate Gaussian to the set of previously observed graphlet degree vectors, {gi} n i=1 using a technique that is robust to outliers. In order to prevent (discovered or undiscovered) anomalies in our historical network data from adversely affecting our model, we use the Minimum Covariance Determinant (MCD) method, which can identify the "best fit" mean and covariance in the presence of up to 50% outliers. More specifically, the user provides a number h between n/2 and n of pure (i.e., non-anomalous) data points, and the algorithm finds the ellipsoid of least volume that covers h points; equivalently, the method omits the n − h largest outliers, and finds the mean and covariance of the remaining h points 6 [6] . Upon receipt of the next time-window's graphlet vector, gn+1 we compute the Mahalanobis distance, 7 which scores how anomalous the new vector is-high scores for very anomalous data, low scores for relatively common data, according to the Gaussian distribution. Our implementation uses SciKit-Learn [4] .
To demonstrate the usefulness of orbit vectors in IP flow analysis, we characterize normal vectors via an unsupervised clustering algorithm (k-means), and use a vector's distance to cluster centers as an anomaly score. Given positive integer k, the algorithm partitions the data into k clusters via a greedy method. To build a detector, we first learn the cluster centers (centroids) by running k-means on a set of observed data points. Next, given a (newly observed) orbit vector, we determine its anomaly score by considering its distance to the nearest centroid. In this study, we used the gap statistic to choose the value of k [7] . Details of our detection experiment and results are given in Section 3.
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP & RESULTS
For a demonstration dataset, network flow data was collected from the main network switch of a small office building in a campus environment, during a typical workday. This traffic exhibited 10,507 IP addresses, with three internal subnets-ethernet (151 IPs), wireless (491 IPs), and a small datacenter (2,153 IPs) with many virtual machines (VMs) on a separate NAT-ed network. This collection of flows serves as ambient traffic. To create a known anomaly, the ambient traffic is combined with a separately-recorded session of bit torrent flows from a single host. As bit torrent participation is disallowed on the office network, the bit torrent R p , Q ∈ R p×p positive definite), is found, the corresponding Gaussian has mean µ, and covariance Σ = Q −1 . 7 Given mean µ and covariance Σ, the Mahalanobis distance is defined of x is (x − µ) t Σ −1 (x − µ) and is (inversely monotonically) equivalent to finding the vector's p-value.
traffic should be abnormal. Furthermore, we expect bit torrent traffic to demonstrate a similar topology to other, more concerning types of traffic, such as peer-to-peer botnet communication or distributed denial of service attacks, which is problematic to generate in a real network setting. To implant the bit torrent traffic, the timestamps were offset, and the host and router IP addresses mapped to their analogues in the building's subnet. Finally, the bit torrent flows are shuffled into the ambient traffic respecting the time sequence of the data.
As discussed in Section 2.1, we now represent the data as a sequence of graphs, (Gi), with time windows of 31 seconds with one second overlap. In total, we observed 350 graphs, averaging 1,265 nodes and 4,901 edges per graph of which 76% were red indicating more data was sent between high port connections than otherwise. Additionally, there were on average 4,929 non-empty flows per time interval; hence, most colored edges represent a single flow. Zooming in on the bit torrent traffic, we find 40 intervals (no. 278-317 in Figure  2 ) in which at least a single flow was attributable to bit torrent traffic. Of these, the first 24 time windows contained roughly 15% bit torrent flows, while the latter 16 intervals had only contained 2% bit torrent flows. For testing, we consider these 24 intervals true positives at the graph level, and the vertex engaging in the bit torrent activity during those intervals a true positive at the node level. As the goal of an anomaly detector is to pinpoint abnormal events, we consider a substantial change in network activity to be a true positive, even if not necessarily malicious. We are unaware of what other anomalies lie in the ambient traffic.
For initial implementation, graphlets of size three and corresponding automorphism orbits are counted to create the sequence of graphlet degree vectors gi and a sequence of orbit count vectors for each vertex v, a i v (see Section 2.2). As three-graphlet counting took under 1.5 seconds per graph, the algorithm can run in near real time. In all, 55 unique 3-graphlets were observed. Using the MCD algorithm (Section 2.3), we fit the initial Gaussian to the first 150 graphlet vectors. For each subsequent vector, we score anomalousness using Mahalanobis distance and re-fit the Gaussian to include the new data point. In this study, h = 0.85n. See Figure 2 , which gives a plot of the anomaly score for each time window. A suggested threshold is displayed in red, and is chosen to maximize the known true-positives while minimizing the number of other points over the threshold. Since the known anomalies are easily discriminated from the majority of the traffic, such a threshold obtains perfect true positive rate, zero false negatives, and we see 5 of 176 unknown anomalies detected. This bounds our graph-level false positive rate by 2.84%. Although we have not proven causality, initial investigation of these unknown anomalies revealed an IP scan of a VM subnet; hence, these may indeed be true (but previously unknown) positives. Further investigation of these detected anomalies will be included in future work.
For node-level detection, we randomly sample 40 IPs with probability proportional to their vertex's occurrence in the data, then cluster their orbit vectors' from the first 150 time intervals. As described in section 2.3, we use the gap statistic and choose k = 5 clusters. For the remaining 200 time intervals the distance of these 40 IPs' orbit vectors to the nearest cluster centroid is plotted on the top line of ing to the known anomalous vertex. As in the graph-level analysis, an appropriate threshold that detects all known anomalies is indicated by the green bars. We note that only 4 of 8000 vectors from the unknown time intervals are detected as anomalous, bounding our false positive rate by 0.05%. The clear disparity in scores exhibited by the known anomalies permits zero false negatives at the node level also.
These results give evidence that graphlet vectors can indicate when anomalies occur in the network, and orbit vectors can identify where these anomalies occur. We expect more accurate detection when larger graphlets are considered. Further analysis is needed to determine the performance/accuracy tradeoff as graphlet and graph sizes grow.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Our evaluation of GraphPrints exhibited 2.84% and 0.05% false positive rates at the graph and node levels, respectively, with 100% true positive rate at both. This confirms that noteworthy changes in network traffic are identifiable using only counts of 3-graphlets / orbits. Furthermore, the discovery of unexpected anomalies illuminates an important area of future research for GraphPrints-how to trace a detected event to (1) particular graphlet / orbit counts, and (2) the specific network traffic that is abnormal. As the Graph-Prints method admits colored nodes, important contextual information-such as an IP's membership in a known subnet, ASN, or country code-can be encoded via node coloring, and we expect future inclusion of this information to yield more informative results. Finally, we believe further investigation of the node-level clusters will allow us to characterize different types of user behavior; for example, perhaps one cluster is comprised of the orbit vectors associated with using email, while another those of web browsing. In summary, this work presents a graph analytic method with promising initial results for analyzing, detecting, and characterizing network flow data, where noteworthy changes in network behavior are identifiable at multiple levels with exceptionally low false positive rates.
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